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VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER BALLOTS SAFEGUARDING OUR VOTING SYSTEMS ELECTION REFORM LEGISLATION VOTER BILL OF RIGHTS
NEED FOR ELECTION REFORMReturn to Top

The threat is real and understood. The evidence of massive vote fraud and tampering during the 2004 elections and since is mounting. Now, what can we do?

To address this question, allow me to share a bit of myself. I am an old, former Vietnam era anti-war protester. I am also an IT professional specializing in Information Systems design and integration. And, I am father to 3 young adults, two of whom voted in their first election this fall.

Cognisant of the vote fraud that occurred in Florida during the 2000 election and as an IT professional, I have followed with scrutinising interest the development and rollout of the new e-voting systems. I realized early on there were anomalies with how these systems were designed. I became alarmed in the aftermath of the 2002 elections due to clear statistical contradictions between certain exit poll and the reported election returns. In particular, I was struck with Max Cleland's defeat which seemingly could not have happened.

With the advent of the 2004 campaigns, I involved myself with blackboxvoting.com and verifiedvoting.org to continue my scrutiny of computerized voting systems and there potential for massive vote fraud and tampering during the 2004 election. Now, I am certain massive fraud occurred and I think I know how it was done (read What Happened?).

As I mentioned, my 3 kids voted in this election (one in West Virginia, two in Texas). I consider myself fortunate to have been born and raised in America. I have a great appreciation of our freedoms, our constitution, and our democracy. I have tried to pass on to my children my deep appreciation. However, this fall, I witnessed the loss of our most important rights, our voting rights. Personal experiences and exit polls demonstrated conclusively that John Kerry won the election. But, George Bush was declared the winner by the reported vote (shades of Max Cleland!). Without the sanctity of our votes, we have no democracy, our constitution is threatened, and our freedom is in peril. Moreover, what is it I can pass on to my children?

As an American citizen, I recognize the responsibilities citizenship imposes. Paramount to being a citizen is the responsibility to protect and defend our system of governance - for it is that system which ensures our freedom. With the compromising of our votes in 2004, our system of government is under attack. As a citizen, it is my responsibility to respond to that attack in defense of our system of government. Indeed, I view this the responsibility of ALL citizens: black, white, rich, poor, Democrat and Republican. It matters not who you voted for. Without a safe and protected ballot box our democracy will not long stand.


ELECTION REFORM: VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER BALLOTSReturn to Top

Voting without paper ballots reduces our voting process to a faith-based proposition. Paperless voting requires that we believe our votes were accurately recorded and counted. Thousands upon thousands of reported incidents during the November 2004 election demonstrate that belief to be ill-founded.

Paper receipts do little to shift the proposition to a more accountable system of voting. When applied only to recounts, paper receipts leave our voting systems vulnerable to unseen manipulation for the vast majority of elections (those not subject to recount). Furthermore, paper receipts delivered to voters raise the spectre of violating the secret ballot by those in positions of authority (employers, police, politicians, religious leaders, etc.) requiring proof from those subject to that power.

Voter-Verifiable Paper Ballots (VVPB), whereby the paper ballot is the official "ballot of record" both for the initial vote count and all subsequent recounts, are the first essential step in providing an accurate, secure, and reliable voting system. Interestingly, in swing states during the November 2004 election, only in counties with paper ballots did the exit polls accurately reflect the reported vote count to within exit polls' historical record of .5% accuracy. Counties lacking a paper ballot showed deviations between exit polls and reported vote totals by as much as 6% (one might rightly ask, "How can this be?"). Thus, paper ballots have demonstrated their worth in forestalling vote tampering, vote count manipulation, and just plain vote processing screw-ups.

ELECTION REFORM: SAFEGUARDING OUR VOTING SYSTEMSReturn to Top

If you own a personal computer connected to the Internet you have had to deal with spam, spyware, phishing exploits and the like. Therefore, you aleady have some experience of how vulnerable electronic information is to intrusion, manipulation, and malicious exploits. Unsecured electronic votes are equally vulnerable to manipulation and tampering without voters' or election officials' knowledge or consent (SEE Blackbox Voting).

Fortunately there exists information system disciplines, processes, and methods designed to maintain the integrity and security of electronic information. Unfortunately, such have NOT been applied to our voting and vote processing systems.(Read VotersUnite.org's Myth Breakers).

What follows is a proposed system to secure Oregon's mail-in voting system - a form of VVPB (Voter-Verifiable Paper Ballots). While written for Oregon, the system of data security described can be applied to any VVPB voting system, and is a model for VVPB systems nationwide.

Oregon Safe Voting Preservation Act
The Oregon voting system is comprised of four distinct pieces which must be safeguarded:
1. Scannable mail-in ballots
2. OCR ballot scanning equipment
3. Ballot data compilers
4. Vote tabulating equipment
Each part of the system is subject to a set of possible intrusions, manipulations, and corruptions. Each piece requires specific interventions and safeguards to ensure Oregon operates a safe, secure, accurate, and reliable voting system.

Scannable Mail-in Ballots This is the heart of Oregon's secure voting system. It is designed to assure all Oregon voters have equal, convenient, and secure access to voting in the state. What the current system lacks is any method for a voter to verify their vote was counted accurately.

OCR Ballot Scanners
OCR Ballot Scanning converts scannable paper ballots to a digital data map of the ballot's contents. The challenge scanners create is how to ensure the scanner's data map faithfully reproduces the information on the original paper ballot.

Ballot Data Compilers
Compilers gather data input from scanning equipment and convert that data into a data record stored in a standardized database format. The challenge with compilers is to ensure the data record accurately and faithfully replicates the intent of the voter as expressed on the original paper ballot.

Vote Tabulating Equipment
VTEs occur in the system at one or more points in the voting process. The state may employ distributed tabulators at the county or precinct level, while maintaining a central tabulator to tabulate all votes in the state. The challenge presented by tabulating equipment are twofold:
Votes are counted accurately and reliably
The data chain of record is unbroken from paper ballot to scanner to compiler to tabulator
What follows are recommended provisions of an Oregon Safe Voting Preservation Act designed to address the challenges imposed by Oregon's current election system.

PROVISION #1: Ballot of Record Provision
Oregon's scannable mail-in ballot is the official ballot of record in the state of Oregon.

PROVISION #2: Voter Verifiable Ballot Provision
Each scannable mail-in paper ballot will be imprinted with a unique identifying number (Unique Ballot Identifier - UBI) on the ballot itself and on a tear-off portion of the ballot each voter may retain.
a. No voter identifying information will be associated with any unglue ballot identifier (UBI) or ballot record
b. Each ballot will contain a provision for each voter to submit an 8-digit alphanumeric Private Vote Identification Number (PVIN) used by the voter in conjunction with their UBI to access their ballot record for review
c. Within 24 hours of polls closing, any voter at any time may access their voting record via their Unique Ballot Identifier (UBI) and Private Vote Identification Number (PVIN) for the purpose of verifying that their vote's data record conforms to their submitted ballot
d. All voters will have 30 days within which to review their recorded votes and challenge their recorded votes prior to state vote certification. The Secretary of State, with the consent of the state assembly, will provide provisions and procedures whereby any voter in the state can challenge their recorded vote within the 30-day challenge period.
PROVISION #3: Ballot Data Integrity Provision
Each Scannable Mail-in Paper Ballot will be imprinted with a Unique Ballot Identifier (UBI). Each vote record will contain the following:
a. UBI (functions as a public encryption key for encrypted record data and as the key field for the data record itself)
b. Encrypted voter supplied Private Vote Identification Number (PVIN)
c. Vote data
d. Scanned image of the paper ballot
e. Encrypted vote record checksum containing the sum of binary data contained within the data record
PROVISION #4: Accessible Source Code Provision
All source code of all software installed on ballot processing and vote tabulation equipment used by the state of Oregon will be accessible for inspection and testing by the citizens of Oregon.

PROVISION #5: Mandatory Manual Audit Provision
All ballot processing and vote tabulation equipment employed to count the vote will undergo citizen-supervised, random Mandatory Manually Audited Ballots (MMAB).
a. Each OCR scanner and each Ballot Data Compiler will be randomly and manually audited by comparing original paper ballots to their scanned database record.
b. Vote tabulating equipment will maintain an unbroken data chain of custody of all ballot data.
c. Audited ballots shall occur at a minimum frequency twice that of tested error rates of each ballot processing equipment type and manufacture employed.
PROVISION #6: No Outsourcing Provision
All ballot processing, vote tabulation, vote recount, and manual audit activities will be performed by state election employees, will be accessible to citizen supervision, and will not be performed by 3rd parties, vendors, or any vendor's representative.

PROVISION #7: No Advance Notification Provision
Neither contracting vendors nor their representatives will be given any advance notice or any advance information of any audit or recount activity. All election processing equipment used by the state of Oregon must be capable of operating in audit or recount configuration without any vendor intervention.

PROVISION #8: Electronic Isolation Provision
All ballot processing equipment and vote tabulating equipment will be isolated from access external to each machine's physical location (the physical room in which the machine is placed) via telecom modem, network connection, or wireless accessibility.
a. Transportation of data from one location to another and to publicly accessible voting record access points will occur solely by transferring data to physical media (paper, CD, DVD, tape) and transporting the physical media under accepted chain-of-custody procedures to the new physical location or publicly accessible access point. Each physical media copy of ballot records will carry an identifier that includes:
- Date/time stamp when the physical copy was made
- Number of ballot records
- Source location of the data records
- Machine identifiers of the scanning and tabulating machines used to gather and process the records contained within the physical media
Example: Timestamp: 11/2/05 8:33PM PST Number of Records: 1242 Location: precinct 27 Scanners Employed: MXC100237, MXC101798, MXF99017 Tabulator ID: PCT00971
b. Ballot processing equipment and vote tabulating equipment may be physically connected for purposes of data transfer within the confines of the ballot processing equipment's physical location.
PROVISION #9: No 3rd Party Influence Provision
No contract for the purchase and/or maintenance of any equipment used to process ballots or tabulate votes will stipulate: recount or auditing processes or procedures; or any ballot processing or vote tabulating processes or procedures beyond the scope of a particular machine's required functionality.

ELECTION REFORM: ELECTION REFORM LEGISLATIONReturn to Top

Investigate election reform legislation from around the country:

National Conference of State Legislatures Election Reform Search
Common Cause Election Bill Tracker

ELECTION REFORM: VOTER BILL OF RIGHTSReturn to Top

In the November 2004 election, voter suppression tactics were refined to the point where millions of voters were denied the ability and right to vote. Among the many tactics perpetrated against American citizens were:
- Fraudulent voter purge lists
- Deliberately inadequate number of voting machines
- Misleading voter information
- Unmarked or changed voting precinct locations
- Poor registration record keeping
- Registration forms lost or thrown away
When political interests and elected officials conspire to deny American citizens their fundimental right to vote, it is time that we the people insist on a Voter Bill of Rights to protect those rights by rule of law and, if necessary, by the intervention of the courts.

51 Capital March - Voter Bill Of Rights


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